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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________ 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
This appeal requires us to decide whether the District 
Court correctly refused to enjoin the defendant School District 
from allowing transgender students to use bathrooms and 
locker rooms that are consistent with the students’ gender 
identities as opposed to the sex they were determined to have 
at birth. The plaintiffs—a group of high school students who 
identify as being the same sex they were determined to have at 
birth (cisgender) —believe the policy violated their 
constitutional rights of bodily privacy, as well as Title IX, and 
Pennsylvania tort law. As we shall explain, we conclude that, 
under the circumstances here, the presence of transgender 
students in the locker and restrooms is no more offensive to 
constitutional or Pennsylvania-law privacy interests than the 
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presence of the other students who are not transgender. Nor 
does their presence infringe on the plaintiffs’ rights under Title  
IX. 
 
In an exceedingly thorough, thoughtful, and well-
reasoned opinion, the District Court denied the requested 
injunction based upon its conclusion that the plaintiffs had not 
shown that they are likely to succeed on the merits and because 
they had not shown that they will be irreparably harmed absent 
the injunction. Although we amplify the District Court’s 
reasoning because of the interest in this issue, we affirm 
substantially for the reasons set forth in the District Court’s 
opinion.  
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A.  The Setting. 
 
Because such seemingly familiar terms as “sex” and 
“gender” can be misleading in the context of the issues raised 
by this litigation, we will begin by explaining and defining 
relevant terms. Our explanation is based on the District Court 
testimony of Dr. Scott Leibowitz, an expert in gender 
dysphoria and gender-identity issues in children and 
adolescents, and the findings that the District Court made 
based upon that expert’s testimony. 
 
“Sex” is defined as the “anatomical and physiological 
processes that lead to or denote male or female.”1 Typically, 
sex is determined at birth based on the appearance of external 
genitalia.2  
 
“Gender” is a “broader societal construct” that 
encompasses how a “society defines what male or female is 
within a certain cultural context.”3A person’s gender identity 
is their subjective, deep-core sense of self as being a particular 
gender. 4  As suggested by the parenthetical in our opening 
paragraph, “cisgender” refers to a person who identifies with 
                                              
1 App. 500. 
2 App. 375.  
3 App. 500. 
4 App. 375. 
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the sex that person was determined to have at birth.5 The term 
“transgender” refers to a person whose gender identity does not 
align with the sex that person was determined to have at birth.6 
A transgender boy is therefore a person who has a lasting, 
persistent male gender identity, though that person’s sex was 
determined to be female at birth.7 A transgender girl is a person 
who has a lasting, persistent female gender identity though that 
person’s sex was determined to be male at birth.8  
 
Approximately 1.4 million adults—or 0.6 percent of the 
adult population of the United States—identify as 
transgender. 9  Transgender individuals may experience 
“gender dysphoria,” which is characterized by significant and 
substantial distress as a result of their birth-determined sex 
being different from their gender identity. 10  Treatment for 
children and adolescents who experience gender dysphoria 
includes social gender transition and physical interventions 
such as puberty blockers, hormone therapy, and sometimes 
surgery.11  
 
“Social gender transition” refers to steps that 
transgender individuals take to present themselves as being the 
gender they most strongly identify with. 12  This typically 
includes adopting a different name that is consistent with that 
gender and using the corresponding pronoun set, wearing 
clothing and hairstyles typically associated with their gender 
identity rather than the sex they were determined to have at 
birth, and using sex-segregated spaces and engaging in sex-
segregated activities that correspond to their gender identity 
rather than their birth-determined sex. 13  For transgender 
individuals, an important part of social gender transition is 
having others perceive them as being the gender the 
                                              
5 App. 393, 550. 
6 App. 375. 
7 App. 2107. 
8 App. 2107. 
9 App. 376. 
10 App. 376-77, 379. 
11 App. 2110. 
12 App. 2110. 
13 App. 2110. 
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transgender individual most strongly identifies with.14 Social 
gender transition can help alleviate gender dysphoria and is a 
useful and important tool for clinicians to ascertain whether 
living in the affirmed gender improves the psychological and 
emotional function of the individual.15  
 
Policies that exclude transgender individuals from 
privacy facilities that are consistent with their gender identities 
“have detrimental effects on the physical and mental health, 
safety, and well-being of transgender individuals.” 16  These 
exclusionary policies exacerbate the risk of “anxiety and 
depression, low self-esteem, engaging in self-injurious 
behaviors, suicide, substance use, homelessness, and eating 
disorders among other adverse outcomes.” 17  The risk of 
succumbing to these conditions is already very high in 
individuals who are transgender.  In a survey of 27,000 
transgender individuals, 40% reported a suicide attempt (a rate 
nine times higher than the general population).18 Yet, when 
transgender students are addressed with gender appropriate 
pronouns and permitted to use facilities that conform to their 
gender identity, those students “reflect the same, healthy 
psychological profile as their peers.”19 
 
Forcing transgender students to use bathrooms or locker 
rooms that do not match their gender identity is particularly 
harmful. It causes “severe psychological distress often leading 
                                              
14 App. 2110. 
15 App. 2111. 
16 Br. for Amici Curiae American Academy of Pediatrics, 
American Medical Association, et al., 17.  
17 Id. at 18 (quoting Am. Psychol. Ass’n & Nat’l Ass’n of 
Sch. Psychologists, Resolution on Gender and Sexual 
Orientation Diversity in Children and Adolescents in Schools 
4 (2015)). 
18 Id. at 18–19 (citing Sandy E. James et al., Nat’l Center for 
Transgender Equality, Report of the 2015 U.S. Transgender 
Survey 114 (2016)). 
19 Br. for Amici Curiae of the National PTA, GLSEN, et al., 7 
(citing Lily Durwood et al., Mental Health and Self Worth in 
Socially Transitioned Transgender Youth, 56 J. of the Am. 
Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry 116, 116 (2017)). 
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to attempted suicide.”20 The result is that those students “avoid 
going to the bathroom by fasting, dehydrating, or otherwise 
forcing themselves not to use the restroom throughout the 
day.” 21  This behavior can lead to medical problems and 
decreases in academic learning.22  
 
We appreciate that there is testimony on this record that 
the cisgender plaintiffs have also reduced water intake, fasted, 
etc. in order to reduce the number of times they need to visit 
the bathroom so they can minimize or avoid encountering 
transgender students there. For reasons we discuss below, we 
do not view the level of stress that cisgender students may 
experience because of appellees’ bathroom and locker room 
policy as comparable to the plight of transgender students who 
are not allowed to use facilities consistent with their gender 
identity. Given the majority of the testimony here and the 
District Court’s well-supported findings, those situations are 
simply not analogous. 
 
Dr. Leibowitz testified that forcing transgender students 
to use facilities that are not aligned with their gender identities 
“chips away and erodes at [the individual’s] psychological 
wellbeing and wholeness.” 23  It can exacerbate gender 
dysphoria symptoms by reinforcing that the “world does not 
                                              
20 Br. for Amici Curiae of the National PTA, GLSEN, et al., 
18 (citing Max Kutner, Denying Transgender People 
Bathroom Access Is Linked to Suicide, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 
16, 2016); Kristen Clements-Nolle, et al., Attempted Suicide 
Among Transgender Persons: The Influence of Gender-Based 
Discrimination and Victimization, 51 Journal of 
Homosexuality 53, 63-65 (2006)). 
21 Br. for Amici Curiae of the National PTA, GLSEN, et al., 
18 (citing Joseph Kosciw, et al., The 2015 National School 
Climate Survey: The Experiences of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, 
Transgender, & Queer Youth in Our Nation’s Schools 12-13, 
GLSEN (2016)). 
22 Id. at 18–19 (citing Jody L. Herman, Gendered Restrooms 
and Minority Stress: The Public Regulation of Gender and Its 
Impact on Transgender People’s Lives, 19 J. of Pub. Mgmt. 
& Soc. Pol’y 65, 74–75 (2013)). 
23 App. 395. 
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appreciate or understand” transgender students.24 In short, it is 
“society reducing them to their genitals.”25 Dr. Leibowitz also 
noted that “hundreds of thousands of physicians in the United 
States . . . take the position that individuals with gender 
dysphoria should not be forced to use a restroom that is not in 
accordance with their gender identity.” 26  We have already 
noted the disparate suicide rates between transgender and 
cisgender students. 
  
Prior to the 2016–17 school year, Boyertown Area 
School District required students at Boyertown Area Senior 
High School (“BASH”) to use locker rooms and bathrooms 
that aligned with their birth-determined sex.27 BASH changed 
this policy in 2016 and for the first time permitted transgender 
students to use restrooms and locker rooms consistent with 
their gender identity. In initiating this policy, BASH adopted a 
very careful process that included student-specific analysis. 
Permission was granted on a case-by-case basis.28  
 
 The District required the student claiming to be 
transgender to meet with counselors who were trained and 
licensed to address these issues and the counselors often 
consulted with additional counselors, principals, and school 
administrators.29 Once a transgender student was approved to 
use the bathroom or locker room that aligned with his or her 
gender identity, the student was required to use only those 
facilities. The student could no longer use the facilities 
corresponding to that student’s sex at birth.30 
 
BASH has several multi-user bathrooms. 31  Each has 
individual toilet stalls.32 Additionally, BASH has between four 
and eight single-user restrooms that are available to all 
                                              
24 App. 395. 
25 App. 396.  
26 App. 397.   
27 App. 625.   
28 App. 604.  
29 App. 638, 923–25.   
30 App. 931–32. 
31 App. 612. 
32 App. 612–13.  
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students, depending on the time of day. 33  Four of these 
restrooms are always available for student use.34 
 
The locker rooms at BASH consist of common areas, 
private “team rooms,” and shower facilities.35 Over the past 
(approximately) two years, BASH has renovated its locker 
rooms. The “gang showers” were replaced with single-user 
showers which have privacy curtains.36 BASH does not require 
a student to change in the locker room prior to gym class, 
although the student must change into gym clothes.37 A student 
who is uncomfortable changing in the locker room can change 
privately in one of the single-user facilities, the private shower 
stalls, or team rooms.38 
 
B. The Litigation. 
 
Four plaintiffs—proceeding pseudonymously under the 
names Joel Doe, Jack Jones, Mary Smith, and Macy Roe—
sued the District after it changed its bathroom and locker room 
policy to the policy we have described above.39 Their claims 
were based on encounters between some of the plaintiffs and 
transgender students in locker rooms or multi-user bathrooms. 
The plaintiffs sought to enjoin BASH’s policy of permitting 
transgender students to use the bathrooms and locker rooms 
that aligned with their gender identities. They sought a 
preliminary injunction on three grounds. First, the plaintiffs 
alleged that the School District’s policy violated their 
constitutional right to bodily privacy. Next, they claimed that 
the School District’s policy violated Title IX of the Education 
                                              
33 App. 613. 
34 App. 616. 
35 App. 617–19.  
36 App. 619–20.  
37 App. 618–19  
38 App. 618–19.   
39  The plaintiffs included parents and guardians of some of 
the anonymous students. The District Court provided a 
detailed recitation of the factual background of this suit, 
including the particular conduct each plaintiff alleges as the 
basis for the alleged violation of a privacy interest. See Doe v. 
Boyertown Area Sch. Dist., 276 F. Supp. 3d 324, 335–64 
(E.D. Pa. 2017).   
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Amendments of 1972 (Title IX).40 Finally, they alleged that the 
policy was contrary to Pennsylvania tort law. After discovery 
and evidentiary hearings, the District Court filed the extensive 
and well-reasoned opinion we have already referred to, in 
which it explained that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated that 
they were likely to succeed on the merits of any of their claims 
and that plaintiffs had not shown that they would be irreparably 
harmed absent an injunction.  
 
For reasons the court identified, it concluded that even 
if the School District’s policy implicated the plaintiffs’ 
constitutional right to privacy, the state had a compelling 
interest in not discriminating against transgender students. The 
court also determined that the School District’s policy was 
narrowly tailored to serve that interest. Accordingly, the 
District Court ruled that even if a cisgender plaintiff had been 
viewed by a transgender student, it would not have violated the 
cisgender student’s constitutional right to privacy. We agree. 
 
The District Court rejected the plaintiffs’ Title IX claim 
for two reasons. First, it found that the School District’s policy 
did not discriminate on the basis of sex, because it applied 
equally to all students—cisgender male and cisgender female, 
as well as transgender male and transgender female students—
alike. The court also concluded that the plaintiffs had not 
identified any conduct that was sufficiently serious to 
constitute Title IX harassment. The mere presence of a 
transgender student in a locker room should not be objectively 
offensive to a reasonable person given the safeguards of the 
school’s policy. 
 
For essentially the reasons described above, the District 
Court also declined to issue an injunction based on the 
Pennsylvania tort of intrusion upon seclusion. It found that 
there was insufficient evidence in the record to demonstrate 
that a transgender student ever viewed a partially clothed 
plaintiff, and that the presence of a transgender student would 
not be highly offensive to a reasonable person.  
 
The District Court rejected the plaintiffs’ theory of 
irreparable harm that posited that the plaintiffs were being 
                                              
40 86 Stat. 373, as amended 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et. seq. 
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forced to give up a constitutional right to use segregated locker 
rooms and bathrooms. It noted that the School District 
permitted the students to use the locker room facilities “without 
limitation.”41 Any student who was uncomfortable being in a 
state of undress or going to the bathroom with transgender 
students could use the single-user bathrooms or team rooms 
that BASH has made available.  
 
Having found that the plaintiffs had no likelihood of 
success on the merits and did not face irreparable harm, the 
District Court entered an order on August 25, 2017 denying the 
injunction. This appeal followed.42 
 
II. DISCUSSION43 
 
Preliminary injunctive relief is an “extraordinary 
remedy.” 44 It may be granted only when the moving party 
shows “(1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) that [the 
movant] will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is denied; 
(3) that granting preliminary relief will not result in even 
greater harm to the nonmoving party; and (4) that the public 
interest favors such relief.” 45  The movants must establish 
entitlement to relief by clear evidence.46 We review the denial 
                                              
41 Doe v. Boyertown Area Sch. Dist., 276 F. Supp. 3d at 410. 
42 Numerous amici filed briefs on behalf of the appellees, and 
one group filed a brief on behalf of the appellants. At the 
conclusion of briefing we heard argument. Recognizing the 
time-sensitive nature of this appeal and the concerns of all of 
the parents and students in the School District, as well as the 
District itself, we adjourned to conference to determine if a 
ruling could be made from the bench. After conferencing, the 
panel voted to unanimously to affirm the ruling of the District 
Court. We announced that decision and entered an 
accompanying order. We now supplement that order with this 
opinion.  
43 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 
1331 and 1343. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1292(a)(1). 
44 Kos Pharm., Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 708 (3d 
Cir. 2004).  
45 Id. 
46 Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008). 
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of a preliminary injunction for “an abuse of discretion, an error 
of law, or a clear mistake in the consideration of proof.”47 We 
exercise plenary review of the lower court’s conclusions of law 
but review its findings of fact for clear error.48 
 
A.  Likelihood of Success on the Merits 
 
 The District Court correctly concluded that the 
appellants were not entitled to an injunction because none of 
their claims are likely to succeed on the merits. 
 
The District Court correctly 
concluded that the 
appellants’ constitutional 
right to privacy claim was 
unlikely to succeed on the 
merits. 
 
The appellants contend that the District Court 
erroneously concluded they were unlikely to succeed on their 
claim that the School District’s policy violated their 
constitutional right to privacy. They assert that the District 
Court (1) failed to recognize the “contours” of the right to 
privacy; (2) failed to recognize that a policy opening up 
facilities to persons of the opposite sex necessarily violates that 
right; (3) erroneously concluded that the School District’s 
policy advanced a compelling interest; and (4) incorrectly 
found that the policy was narrowly tailored to serve that 
interest. We reject each of these arguments in turn. 
 
The appellants’ challenge to the School District’s policy 
was brought as a civil rights claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 
1983. Section 1983 claims can succeed only if the underlying 
act—here, the alleged exposure of the appellants’ partially 
clothed bodies to transgender students whose birth-determined 
sex differed from the appellants—violated a constitutional 
right. 49  When a plaintiff’s § 1983 claim is premised on a 
                                              
47 Kos Pharm., 369 F.3d at 708 (citation omitted). 
48 Id. (citations omitted). 
49 Doe v. SEPTA, 72 F.3d 1133, 1137 (3d Cir. 1995) (“A § 
1983 action cannot be maintained unless the underlying act 
violates a plaintiff’s [c]onstitutional rights.”).  
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violation of the constitutional right to privacy, it will succeed 
only if it is “limited to those rights of privacy which are 
fundamental or implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”50  
 
The touchstone of constitutional privacy protection is 
whether the information at issue is “within an individual’s 
reasonable expectations of confidentiality.” 51  The Supreme 
Court has acknowledged two types of constitutional privacy 
interests rooted in the Fourteenth Amendment—“the 
individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters” 
and the “interest in independence in making certain kinds of 
important decisions.” 52 Based on the first principal described 
above, we have held that a person has a constitutionally 
protected privacy interest in his or her partially clothed body.53  
                                              
50 Id. (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976) 
(alterations and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
51 Doe v. Luzerne County, 660 F.3d 169, 175 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(quoting Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 564 (3d Cir. 
2011)). 
52 Id. (citations omitted). 
53 Id. at 177. Other Circuits have come to the same 
conclusion. Brannum v. Overton Cty. School Bd., 516 F.3d 
489, 494, 498 (6th Cir. 2008) (finding a violation of the 
Fourth Amendment right to privacy when a school surveilled 
partially clothed middle school students in their locker room, 
and further noting that this is the “same privacy right . . . 
located in the Due Process clause”); Poe v. Leonard, 282 F.3d 
123, 136 (2d Cir. 2002) (“[T]here is a right to privacy in 
one’s unclothed or partially clothed body.”); York v. Story, 
324 F.2d 450, 455 (9th Cir. 1963) (“We cannot conceive of a 
more basic subject of privacy than the naked body. The desire 
to shield one’s unclothed [figure] from view of strangers, and 
particularly strangers of the opposite sex, is impelled by 
elementary self-respect and personal dignity.”). The District 
Court noted that Doe v. Luzerne County did not explicitly 
hold there was a constitutional right to privacy in an 
individual’s unclothed or partially clothed body. However, by 
concluding that Doe had a reasonable expectation of privacy 
and remanding the case to determine the exact contours of 
that right, we implicitly recognized that such a privacy right 
exists. The District Court assumed the existence of the right, 
and the parties seemingly agreed that the right exists. If there 
14 
 
The appellants advance two main arguments in support 
of their contention that their right to privacy was violated by 
the School District’s policy of permitting transgender students 
to use bathrooms and locker rooms that aligned with their 
gender identities. Neither is persuasive. 
 
First, the appellants claim that their right to privacy was 
violated because the policy permitted them to be viewed by 
members of the opposite sex while partially clothed. 54 
Regardless of the degree of the appellants’ undress at the time 
of the encounters, the District Court correctly found that this 
would not give rise to a constitutional violation because the 
School District’s policy served a compelling interest—
preventing discrimination against transgender students—and 
was narrowly tailored to that interest.  
 
The constitutional right to privacy is not absolute.55  It 
must be weighed against important competing governmental 
interests. 56  Only unjustified invasions of privacy by the 
government are actionable in a § 1983 claim.57 That is, the 
constitution forbids governmental infringement on certain 
fundamental interests unless that infringement is sufficiently 
                                              
were any doubt after Doe v. Luzerne County that the 
constitution recognizes a right to privacy in a person’s 
unclothed or partially clothed body, we hold today that such a 
right exists.  
54 See Br. for Appellants, 18 (“The privacy interest is vitiated 
when a member of one sex is viewed by a member of the 
opposite sex.” (citation omitted)). 
55 Doe v. SEPTA, 72 F.3d at 1138.  
56 Doe v. Luzerne County, 660 F.3d at 178; Sterling v. 
Borough of Minersville, 232 F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(“In examining right to privacy claims, we, therefore, balance 
a possible and responsible government interest in disclosure 
against the individual’s policy interest.”). 
57 See Doe v. SEPTA, 72 F.3d at 1138 (citing Whalen v. Roe, 
429 U.S. 589, 602 (1977)); see also Olmstead v. United 
States, 277 U.S. 438, 478–79  (1928) (Brandies, J., 
dissenting) (“every unjustifiable intrusion upon the privacy of 
an individual . . . must be deemed a [constitutional] violation” 
(emphasis added)). 
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tailored to serve a compelling state interest. 58  The District 
Court found that the School District’s policy served “a 
compelling state interest in not discriminating against 
transgender students” and was narrowly tailored to that 
interest.59 We agree. 
 
As set forth in detail above, transgender students face 
extraordinary social, psychological, and medical risks and the 
School District clearly had a compelling state interest in 
shielding them from discrimination. There can be “no denying 
that transgender individuals face discrimination, harassment, 
and violence because of their gender identity.”60 The risk of 
experiencing substantial clinical distress as a result of gender 
dysphoria is particularly high among children and may 
intensify during puberty.61 The Supreme Court has regularly 
held that the state has a compelling interest in protecting the 
physical and psychological well-being of minors.62 We have 
                                              
58 Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301–02 (1993). The District 
Court found that this “compelling interest” analysis was the 
appropriate level to review BASH’s policy. Doe v. Boyertown 
Area Sch. Dist., 276 F. Supp. 3d at 390 (citing Reno, 507 U.S. 
at 302). The parties do not explicitly challenge this choice. 
Br. for Appellants, 27-33; Br. for Appellees, 30; Br. for 
Intervenor-Appellee, 36. In other privacy-rights contexts, we 
have found that an “intermediate standard of review” was 
appropriate, and that the “more stringent ‘compelling interest 
analysis’ would be used when the intrusion on an individual’s 
privacy was severe.” Doe v. SEPTA, 72 F.3d at 1139–40. 
Because we hold that BASH’s policy survives the more 
stringent standard of review, we need not decide which 
standard of review is appropriate here.  
59 Doe v. Boyertown Area Sch. Dist., 276 F. Supp. 3d at 390. 
60 Whitaker by Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 
Bd. of Educ., 858 F.3d 1034, 1051 (7th Cir. 2017). 
61 App. 2276–78. 
62 See Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. F.C.C., 492 U.S. 115, 
125 (1989) (“We have recognized that there is 
a compelling interest in protecting the physical and 
psychological well-being of minors. This interest extends to 
shielding minors from the influence of literature that is not 
obscene by adult standards.”); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 
U.S. 629, 640 (1968) (a state “has an independent interest in 
16 
 
similarly found that the government has a compelling interest 
in protecting and caring for children in various contexts. 63 
Mistreatment of transgender students can exacerbate gender 
dysphoria, lead to negative educational outcomes, and 
precipitate self-injurious behavior. When transgender students 
face discrimination in schools, the risk to their wellbeing 
cannot be overstated—indeed, it can be life threatening. This 
record clearly supports the District Court’s conclusion that the 
School District had a compelling state interest in protecting 
transgender students from discrimination. 
 
Moreover, the School District’s policy fosters an 
environment of inclusivity, acceptance, and tolerance. As the 
appellees’ amicus brief from the National Education 
Association convincingly explains, these values serve an 
important educational function for both transgender and 
cisgender students.64 When a school promotes diversity and 
inclusion, “classroom discussion is livelier, more spirited, and 
simply more enlightening and interesting [because] the 
students have the greatest possible variety of backgrounds.”65 
Students in diverse learning environments have higher 
academic achievement leading to better outcomes for all 
students. 66  Public education “must prepare pupils for 
                                              
the well-being of its youth”); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 
747, 756–57 (1982) (“It is evident beyond the need for 
elaboration that a State's interest in ‘safeguarding the physical 
and psychological well-being of a minor’ is ‘compelling.’” 
(quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 
596, 607 (1982))). 
63 See, e.g., Croft v. Westmoreland Cty. Children & Youth 
Servs., 103 F.3d 1123, 1125 (3d Cir. 1997) (noting that the 
government has a compelling interest in the “protection of 
children,” and in protecting children from abuse). 
64 Br. for Amicus Curiae National Education Association, 7–
11.  
65 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003).  
66 Br. for Amicus Curiae National Education Association, 9–
10 (citing Stephen Brand et al., Middle School Improvement 
and Reform: Development and Validation of a School- Level 
Assessment of Climate, Cultural Pluralism and School Safety, 
95 J. Educ. Psychol. 570, 571 (2003); John Rosales, Positive 
School Cultures Thrive When Support Staff Included, NEA 
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citizenship in the Republic,”67 and inclusive classrooms reduce 
prejudices and promote diverse relationships which later 
benefit students in the workplace and in their communities.68 
Accordingly, the School District’s policy not only serves the 
compelling interest of protecting transgender students, but it 
benefits all students by promoting acceptance. 
 
As we have already noted, we do not intend to minimize 
or ignore testimony suggesting that some of the appellants now 
avoid using the restrooms and reduce their water intake in order 
to reduce the number of times they need to use restrooms under 
the new policy. Nor do we discount the surprise the appellants 
reported feeling when in an intimate space with a student they 
understood was of the opposite biological sex.69 We cannot, 
however, equate the situation the appellants now face with the 
very drastic consequences that the transgender students must 
endure if the school were to ignore the latter’s needs and 
concerns. Moreover, as we have mentioned, those cisgender 
students who feel that they must try to limit trips to the 
                                              
Today (Jan. 10, 2017); N. Eugene Walls et al. Gay-Straight 
Alliances and School Experiences of Sexual Minority Youth, 
41 Youth & Soc’y 307, 323-25 (2010); Stephen T. Russell, 
Are School Policies Focused on Sexual Orientation and 
Gender Identity Associated with Less Bullying? Teachers’ 
Perspectives, 54 J. Sch. Psychol. 29 (2016)). 
67 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 
(1986) (citation omitted). 
68 Br. for Amicus Curiae National Education Association, 10 
(citing Jeanne L. Reid & Sharon Lynn Kagan, A Better Start: 
Why Classroom Diversity Matters in Early Education 9 (Apr. 
2015)). 
69 App. 276, 1943. To the extent that the appellants’ claim for 
relief arises from the embarrassment and surprise they felt 
after seeing a transgender student in a particular space, they 
are actually complaining about the implementation of the 
policy and the lack of pre-implementation communication. 
That is an administrative issue, not a constitutional one. To 
the extent that the appellants are expressing discomfort being 
around students whom they define as different from 
themselves, that discomfort does not implicate a privacy 
interest, even when viewed through the lens of strict scrutiny.   
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restroom to avoid contact with transgender students can use the 
single-user bathrooms in the school.  
 
Assuming the policy is subject to strict scrutiny, it must 
advance a compelling state interest and the means of achieving 
that interest must be “specifically and narrowly framed to 
accomplish that purpose.” 70  Having correctly identified a 
compelling state interest, the District Court correctly held that 
the School District’s policy was narrowly tailored. The 
appellants contend that “a much more tailored solution is to 
provide single-user accommodations.”71 They reason that “all 
students would be allowed to access the individual facilities, 
[so] no stigma would attach to the professed transgender 
students’ using them, and preserving the sex-specific 
communal facilities to single-sex use would resolve all privacy 
concerns.”72  
 
This argument is not only unpersuasive, it fails to 
comprehend the depths of the problems the School District’s 
policy was trying to remedy or the steps taken to address them. 
The School District already provides single-user 
accommodations for all students. Any student who is 
uncomfortable changing around their peers in private spaces, 
whether transgender or cisgender, may change in a bathroom 
stall, single-user bathroom, or the private team rooms.73 The 
appellants seemingly admit that these accommodations 
“resolve all privacy concerns.”74 Yet they insist that the policy 
should be changed to require that transgender students use 
individual bathrooms if they do not wish to use the communal 
facilities that align with their birth-determined sex. Not only 
would forcing transgender students to use single-user facilities 
or those that correspond to their birth sex not serve the 
compelling interest that the School District has identified here, 
it would significantly undermine it.75 As the Court of Appeals 
                                              
70 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333 (quoting Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 
899, 908 (1996)). 
71 Br. for Appellants, 32.  
72 Id. 
73 App. 618–19.  
74 Br. for Appellants, 32. 
75 See Br. for Amici Curiae American Academy of Pediatrics 
et al., 17–18. (“[F]orcing transgender students to use separate 
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for the Seventh Circuit has recognized, a school district’s 
policy that required a transgender student to use single-user 
facilities “actually invited more scrutiny and attention from his 
peers.” 76  Adopting the appellants’ position would very 
publicly brand all transgender students with a scarlet “T,” and 
they should not have to endure that as the price of attending 
their public school. 
 
Nothing in the record suggests that cisgender students 
who voluntarily elect to use single-user facilities to avoid 
transgender students face the same extraordinary consequences 
as transgender students would if they were forced to use them. 
As we explain more fully below, requiring transgender 
students to use single user or birth-sex-aligned facilities is its 
own form of discrimination. 
 
It is therefore clear that the District Court was correct in 
concluding that the appellants are unlikely to succeed in 
establishing a violation of their right to privacy based on a 
transgender student potentially viewing them in a state of 
undress in a locker room or restroom. The challenged policy is 
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. 
There is no constitutional violation. 
 
The appellants also urge us to recognize constitutional 
privacy protections for alleged violations that resulted from 
conduct other than being viewed by transgender students in a 
locker room or bathroom. They assert that “government actors 
cannot force minors to endure the risk of unconsented intimate 
exposure to the opposite sex as a condition for using the very 
facilities set aside to protect their privacy.”77 They claim that 
their constitutional privacy rights were violated “when the 
sexes intermingle[d]” in the bathrooms and locker rooms.78 
They also argue that the female appellants’ privacy rights are 
violated if they are forced to attend to their menstrual hygiene 
in a facility where members of the opposite sex may potentially 
                                              
facilities sends a stigmatizing message that can have a lasting 
and damaging impact on the health and well-being of the 
young person.”). 
76 Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1045. 
77 Br. for Appellants, 18 (emphasis added).  
78 Id. at 27. 
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be present. 79  In other words, they contend that their 
constitutional right to privacy is necessarily violated because 
they are forced to share bathrooms and locker rooms with 
transgender students whose gender identities correspond with 
the sex-segregated space, but do not do not align with their 
birth sex.  
 
We reject the premise of this argument because BASH’s 
policy does not force any cisgender student to disrobe in the 
presence of any student—cisgender or transgender. BASH has 
provided facilities for any student who does not feel 
comfortable being in the confines of a communal restroom or 
locker room. BASH has installed privacy stalls and set some 
bathrooms aside as single-user facilities so that any student 
who is uneasy undressing or using a restroom in the presence 
of others can take steps to avoid contact. BASH’s policy does 
not compel a privacy violation for any student. 
 
 In any event, we decline to recognize such an expansive 
constitutional right to privacy—a right that would be violated 
by the presence of students who do not share the same birth 
sex. Moreover, no court has ever done so. As counsel for the 
School District noted during oral argument, the appellants are 
claiming a very broad right of personal privacy in a space that 
is, by definition and common usage, just not that private. 
School locker rooms and restrooms are spaces where it is not 
only common to encounter others in various stages of undress, 
it is expected. The facilities exist so that students can attend to 
their personal biological and hygienic needs and change their 
clothing. As the Supreme Court has stated, “[p]ublic school 
locker rooms . . . are not notable for the privacy they afford.”80  
 
Thus, we are unpersuaded to the extent that the 
appellants’ asserted privacy interest requires protection from 
the risk of encountering students in a bathroom or locker room 
whom appellants identify as being members of the opposite 
sex. As the Seventh Circuit noted in Whitaker “[a] transgender 
student’s presence in the restroom provides no more of a risk 
                                              
79 Id. at 26. We note that the appellants do not allege that the 
female plaintiffs ever actually tended to their periods in the 
presence of a transgender female student. 
80 Veronia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 657 (1995).  
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to other students’ privacy rights than the presence of an overly 
curious student of the same biological sex who decides to 
sneak glances at his or her classmates performing their bodily 
functions.”81  
 
None of the cases cited by the appellants is to the 
contrary. 82 For example, in their brief and at argument, they 
placed substantial reliance on Faulkner v. Jones 83  for the 
proposition that “society [has] undisputed[ly] approv[ed] 
separate public restrooms for men and women based on 
privacy concerns. The need for privacy justifies separation . . . 
.”84 But that case did not recognize a constitutional mandate 
that bathrooms and locker rooms must be segregated by birth-
determined sex. Although it acknowledged that privacy 
concerns may justify separate facilities for men and women in 
certain circumstances,85 it did not hold that the Constitution 
compels separate bathroom facilities. Moreover, as we have 
explained and as the District Court more thoroughly described, 
BASH has carefully crafted a policy that attempts to address 
the concerns that some cisgender students may have. To its 
credit, it has done so in a way that recognizes those concerns 
as well as the needs, humanity, and decency of transgender 
students.  
 
The appellants’ reliance on Chaney v. Plainfield 
Healthcare Center86  is similarly unconvincing. That was an 
appeal from a Title VII suit brought against a nursing home 
after a Black nursing assistant was fired for protesting a 
patient’s demand that he receive care only from White nursing 
aids. 87  The court distinguished medical care based on race 
                                              
81 Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1052. 
82 Br. for Appellee, 15–31.  
83 10 F.3d 226 (4th Cir. 1993). 
84 Br. for Appellants, 17 (alterations added) (quoting 
Faulkner, 10 F.3d at 232). 
85 Faulkner, 10 F.3d at 232 (“In the end, distinctions in any 
separate facilities provided for males and females may be 
based on real differences between the sexes, both in quality 
and quantity, so long as the distinctions are not based on 
stereotyped or generalized perceptions of differences.”). 
86 612 F.3d 908, 913 (7th Cir. 2010). 
87 Chaney, 612 F.3d at 910–12. 
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from medical care based on sex, noting that just as “the law 
tolerates same-sex restrooms or same-sex dressing rooms . . . 
to accommodate privacy needs, Title VII allows an employer 
to respect a preference for same-sex health providers, but not 
same-race providers.”88 Like Faulkner, Chaney held that the 
Constitution tolerates single-sex accommodations. It did not 
hold that the constitution demands it. 
 
Equally unpersuasive is the appellants’ reliance on 
cases discussing far more intrusive invasions of privacy than 
allowed by BASH’s policy. Cases about strip searches89 and a 
criminal conviction for voyeurism after a person repeatedly 
looked at women in the stalls of public restrooms90 are wholly 
unhelpful to our analysis. Those cases involve inappropriate 
conduct as well as conduct that intruded into far more “intimate 
aspects of human affairs” than here.91 There is simply nothing 
inappropriate about transgender students using the restrooms 
or locker rooms that correspond to their gender identity under 
the policy BASH has initiated, and we reject appellants’ 
attempt to argue that there is. Appellants do not contend that 
transgender Students A or B did anything remotely out of the 
ordinary while using BASH’s facilities. Indeed, the appellants’ 
privacy complaint is not with transgender students’ conduct, 
but with their mere presence. We have already explained that 
the presence of transgender students in these spaces does not 
offend the constitutional right of privacy any more than the 
presence of cisgender students in those spaces.  
 
In an argument that completely misses (or deliberately 
ignores) the reason for the disputed policy or the circumstances 
it addresses, the appellants insist that it is improper to consider 
a student’s transgender status when conducting this privacy 
analysis and that we must only look at the student’s anatomy.92 
We disagree. Constitutional right to privacy cases “necessarily 
                                              
88 Id. at 913. 
89 Canedy v. Boardman, 16 F.3d 183, 185–86, 188 (7th Cir. 
1994). 
90 State v. Lawson, 340 P.3d 979 (Wash. App. 2014). 
91 Doe v. Luzerne County, 660 F.3d at 176 (quoting Nunez v. 
Pachman, 578 F.3d 228, 232 (3d Cir. 2009)). 
92 Br. for Appellants, 10–12.  
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require fact-intensive and context-specific analyses.”93 Bright 
line rules cannot be drawn.94 Put simply—the facts of a given 
case are critically important when assessing whether a 
constitutional right to privacy has been violated. A case 
involving transgender students using facilities aligned with 
their gender identities after seeking and receiving approval 
from trained school counselors and administrators implicates 
different privacy concerns than, for example, a case involving 
an adult stranger sneaking into a locker room to watch a 
fourteen year-old girl shower. The latter scenario—taken from 
a case the appellants rely upon95— is simply not analogous to 
the circumstances here.     
1. The District Court 
correctly concluded that 
the appellants’ Title IX 
claim was unlikely to 
succeed on the merits.  
 
The District Court rejected the appellants’ Title IX 
claim because the School District’s policy treated all students 
equally and therefore did not discriminate on the basis of sex, 
and because the appellants had failed to meet the elements of a 
“hostile environment harassment” claim. We again agree. We 
also agree with the School District’s position that barring 
transgender students from restrooms that align with their 
gender identity would itself pose a potential Title IX violation.  
 
Title IX prohibits discrimination based on sex in all 
educational programs that receive funds from the federal 
government.96 However, discrimination with regard to privacy 
facilities is exempt from that blanket prohibition. An institution 
“may provide separate toilet, locker room, and shower 
facilities on the basis of sex, but such facilities provided for 
students of one sex shall be comparable to such facilities 
provided for students of the other sex.” 97 This exception is 
                                              
93 Doe v. Luzerne County, 660 F.3d at 176. 
94 Id.  
95 People v. Grunau, No. H015871, 2009 WL 5149857 (Cal. 
Ct. App. Dec. 29, 2009) (unpublished memorandum opinion). 
96 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). 
97 34 C.F.R. § 106.33. 
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permissive—Title IX does not require that an institution 
provide separate privacy facilities for the sexes.  
 
Title IX also supports a cause of action for “hostile 
environment harassment.” 98  To recover on such a claim, a 
plaintiff must establish sexual harassment that is so severe, 
pervasive, or objectively offensive and that “so undermines 
and detracts from the victims’ educational experience that [he 
or she] is effectively denied equal access to an institution’s 
resources and opportunities.”99 To support a claim of hostile 
environment harassment, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the 
offensive conduct occurred because of his or her sex.100  
 
Title IX’s “hostile environment harassment” cause of 
action originated in a series of cases decided under Title VII of 
                                              
98 DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301, 316 n.14 (3d Cir. 
2008) (citation omitted).  
99 Id. (alterations in original) (citation omitted). We recently 
noted that we have not always been consistent in stating 
whether a plaintiff claiming sexual harassment must prove the 
harassment was “severe or pervasive” or “severe and 
pervasive.” Castleberry v. STI Grp., 863 F.3d 259, 263–64 
(3d Cir. 2017) (emphasis added). Much of the confusion 
stems from the fact that the Supreme Court has used both the 
conjunctive and the disjunctive to describe the plaintiff’s 
burden. Compare Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 
57, 67 (1986) (“For sexual harassment to be actionable, it 
must be sufficiently severe or pervasive . . . .”), with Davis 
Next Friend LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 
U.S. 629, 633 (1999) (concluding that an action for Title IX 
harassment “will lie only for harassment that is so severe, 
pervasive and objectively offensive that it effectively bars the 
victim’s access to an educational opportunity or benefit”).  In 
Castleberry, we concluded that the “correct standard is severe 
or pervasive. Castleberry, 863 F.3d at 264.  Accordingly, we 
will proceed using the disjunctive inquiry here. 
100 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 
81 (1998) (holding, in the Title VII context, that a plaintiff 
“must always prove that the conduct at issue . . . constituted 
discrimination because of . . . sex.” (internal quotations 
omitted)).  
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the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”).101 The Supreme 
Court has “extended an analogous cause of action to students 
under Title IX.”102 Title VII cases are therefore instructive.103  
 
Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating based 
on sex.104 In Oncale, the Supreme Court considered whether 
Title VII prohibited “discrimination because of sex” when the 
harasser and the harassed employee were the same sex.105 In 
concluding that Title VII could support such a claim, the Court 
held that Title VII is concerned only with “discrimination 
because of sex.”106 It noted that the Court had never held that 
“workplace harassment, even harassment between men and 
women, is automatically discrimination because of sex merely 
because the words used have sexual content or 
connotations.” 107  Rather, “the critical issue . . . is whether 
members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or 
conditions of employment to which members of the other sex 
are not exposed.”108 The plaintiffs in a Title VII action must 
therefore always “prove that the conduct at issue was not 
merely tinged with offensive sexual connotations, but actually 
constituted discrimination because of sex.” 109  The same 
requirement holds true for Title IX claims. 
 
The appellants have not provided any authority—either 
in the District Court or on appeal—to suggest that a sex-neutral 
policy can give rise to a Title IX claim. Instead, they simply 
                                              
101 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. 
102 Saxe v. State College Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 205 
(3d Cir. 2001).  
103 Id. Courts have frequently looked to Title VII authority for 
guidance with Title IX cases. See, e.g., Olmstead v. L.C. ex 
rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 616 n.1 (1999) (“This Court has 
also looked to its Title VII interpretations of discrimination in 
illuminating Title IX.” (collecting cases)). 
104 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. 
105 Oncale, 523 U.S. at 76. 
106 Id. at 80. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 
(1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)).  
109 Id. at 81 (internal alterations, emphasis, and quotation 
marks omitted). 
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hypothesize that “harassment” that targets both sexes equally 
would violate Title IX; that is simply not the law. 110  The 
touchstone of both Title VII and Title IX claims is disparate 
treatment based on sex.111 The School District’s policy allows 
all students to use bathrooms and locker rooms that align with 
their gender identity. It does not discriminate based on sex, and 
therefore does not offend Title IX.  
 
The District Court also correctly found that the 
appellants had not met their burden of establishing that the 
mere presence of transgender students in bathrooms and locker 
rooms constitutes sexual harassment so severe, pervasive, or 
objectively offensive and “that so undermines and detracts 
from the victims’ educational experience that [the plaintiff] is 
effectively denied equal access to an institution’s resources and 
opportunities.” 112  That is particularly true given the many 
safeguards the School District put in place as part of the 
challenged policy. 
 
Rather than relying on relevant legal authority to 
establish that the mere presence of a transgender student in a 
locker room or bathroom rises to the level of harassment, the 
appellants again cite inapposite cases that involve egregious 
harassment. That is not surprising since we have found no 
authority that supports the appellants’ claims. Two cases that 
the appellants attempt to analogize to their situation are 
particularly illustrative of the weakness of their position—
                                              
110 See Pasqual v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 101 F.3d 514, 517 (7th 
Cir. 1996) (“Harassment that is inflicted without regard to 
gender, that is, where males and females in the same setting 
do not receive disparate treatment, is not actionable because 
the harassment is not based on sex.”); Henson v. City of 
Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982) (“[T]here may be 
cases in which a supervisor makes sexual overtures of both 
sexes or where the conduct complained of is equally offensive 
to male and female workers. In such cases, [the] harassment 
would not be based on sex because men and women are 
accorded like treatment . . . and the plaintiff would have no 
remedy under Title VII.”). 
111 Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80. 
112 DeJohn, 537 F.3d at 316 n.14 (citations omitted). 
27 
 
Lewis v. Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority 113  and 
Schonauer v. DCR Entertainment Inc. 114  Lewis involved 
harassment that is worlds apart from anything in the present 
record. There, cisgender men not only entered a locker room 
while cisgender female employees were changing, they 
“leer[ed]” at them, “crowd[ed] the entrance to the locker room, 
forcing [them] to ‘run the gauntlet[,]’ and brush[ed] up against 
them.”115 When a supervisor was informed, he referred to the 
female employees as “cunts” and “the biggest bunch of fucking 
crybabies.” 116  Any comparison to the circumstances the 
appellants face here is patently frivolous. 
 
Schonauer is also distinguishable. There, the plaintiff 
was employed as a beverage server at a topless nightclub and 
alleged that she had been harassed by a manager.117  In addition 
to entering the women’s changing facility, the manager 
repeatedly encouraged the plaintiff to enter nude dance 
contests, asked questions about her sexual fantasies, and 
probed her sexual history.118 When the plaintiff resisted these 
advances, she was fired.119 The Washington Court of Appeals 
found that this behavior could constitute harassment not simply 
because the manager entered the changing facility, but because 
he pressed the plaintiff to “provide sexually explicit 
information and to dance on stage in a sexually provocative 
way.”120  
  
The District Court no doubt realized that the appellants’ 
attempt to seize upon Lewis and Schonauer demonstrated the 
weakness of their arguments.  Here, there are no allegations of 
harassment, let alone any that are even remotely as “severe, 
pervasive, [or] objectively offensive.”121  Still, the appellants 
                                              
113 77 F. Supp. 2d 376, 377–78 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). 
114 905 P.2d 392, 396–97, 400–01 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995). 
115 77 F. Supp. 2d at 377. 
116 Id. at 378. 
117 Schonauer, 905 P.2d at 396. 
118 Id. at 396–97.  
119 Id. at 397. 
120 Id. at 400. 
121 DeJohn, 537 F.3d at 316 n.14; Castleberry, 863 F.3d at 
264. 
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unconvincingly try to equate mere presence in a space with 
harassing activity.   
 
This case is far more analogous to Cruzan v. Special 
School Dist., No. 1, 122  a Title VII case from the Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. Cruzan held that a transgender 
individual in a bathroom did not create a hostile environment 
because there was no evidence that the individual “engaged in 
any inappropriate conduct other than merely being present in 
the women’s faculty restroom.” 123  That is, a transgender 
person in a restroom did not create an environment that was 
“permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and 
insult” as required to sustain a harassment claim under Title 
VII.124 We agree with the Eight Circuit’s conclusion. As we 
have emphasized, the appellants’ real objection is to the 
presence of transgender students, not to any “environment” 
their presence creates. Indeed, the allegations here include an 
assertion that a cisgender student was harassed merely by a 
transgender student washing that student’s own hands in a 
bathroom or changing in a locker room. That is not the type of 
conduct that supports a Title IX hostile environment claim.125 
The District Court recognized this and correctly ruled that this 
claim was unlikely to succeed. 
 
The School District, on the other hand, contends that 
barring transgender students from using privacy facilities that 
align with their gender identity would, itself, constitute 
discrimination under a sex-stereotyping theory in violation of 
Title IX.126 We need not decide that very different issue here. 
We note only that the School District’s argument finds support 
in the very persuasive opinion from the Seventh Circuit in 
Whitaker, and the analysis there supports the District Court’s 
conclusion that appellants were not likely to succeed on the 
merits of their Title IX claim. 
                                              
122 294 F.3d 981, 984 (8th Cir. 2002). 
123 Id.  
124 Id. (citation omitted). 
125 This is not to say that the transgender students could not 
engage in conduct that would rise to the level of harassment. 
It would be the same conduct required for cisgender students 
to harass someone. 
126 Br. for Appellees, 38–40.  
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In Whitaker, a transgender boy sued the Kenosha 
Unified School District for prohibiting him from using the 
boys’ bathrooms and locker room. 127  He alleged that 
Kenosha’s policy violated Title IX and denied him equal 
protection.128 The District Court agreed and the school district 
appealed. 129  The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
affirmed, finding that Kenosha’s policy constituted sex-based 
discrimination. 
 
Specifically, Whitaker held that Kenosha’s policy 
violated Title IX because it discriminated against transgender 
people based on their failure to conform to sex stereotypes.130 
“By definition, a transgender individual does not conform to 
the sex-based stereotypes of the sex that he or she was assigned 
at birth.” 131  Accordingly, Kenosha’s policy subjected 
Whitaker, “as a transgender student, to different rules, 
sanctions, and treatment than non-transgender students, in 
violation of Title IX.”132 The court also dismissed Kenosha’s 
argument that gender-neutral bathroom alternatives were 
sufficient because such a policy would itself violate the Act.133 
 
Whitaker explained that the Supreme Court has adopted 
an expansive view of “sex” under Title VII. 134 Rather than 
limit the definition of sex to one’s anatomy, a plurality of the 
Supreme Court held in Price Waterhouse that Title VII 
“intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment 
of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.” 135 The 
Supreme Court reiterated Title VII’s broad view of “sex” in 
Oncale, wherein Justice Scalia wrote that “statutory provisions 
often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably 
comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws 
rather than the principal concern of our legislators by which we 
                                              
127 Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1042. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. at 1042–43.  
130 Id. at 1048–49.  
131 Id. at 1048. 
132 Id. at 1049–50.  
133 Id. at 1049–50 
134 Id. at 1048. 
135 Id. at 1047–48 (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 
U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (plurality)). 
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are governed.” 136  Whitaker noted that, following Price 
Waterhouse, many courts (including the Third Circuit) have 
recognized a cause of action under Title VII when an employee 
faces discrimination for failing to conform to sex 
stereotypes.137 
 
The injunction that the appellants have requested here 
would essentially have replicated the Kenosha policy. The 
Boyertown Area School District can hardly be faulted for being 
proactive in adopting a policy that avoids the issues that would 
have otherwise arisen under Title IX. Contrary to the 
appellants’ assertions, “sex” has not been narrowly limited to 
a person’s anatomy under Title VII—nor by analogy is it so 
limited under Title IX.   
 
This conclusion is a natural extension of our decision in 
Prowel v. Wise Business Forms, Inc, where we recognized that 
a plaintiff can state a claim under Title VII for sexual 
discrimination based on gender stereotyping.138 While Prowel 
did not involve a transgender person, we did consider whether 
a man who did not adhere to male gender stereotypes could 
state a claim for sex discrimination under Title VII.139 Relying 
on Price Waterhouse, we held that Title VII’s prohibition on 
discrimination “because of sex” also prohibited discriminating 
against someone who did not conform to gender stereotypes.140  
 
Title IX prohibits discrimination against transgender 
students in school facilities just as Title VII prohibited 
discrimination against Prowel in the workplace. Therefore a 
court may not issue an injunction that would subject the 
                                              
136 Id. at 1048 (quoting Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79). 
137 Id. (citing Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 580–81 
(7th Cir. 1997), vacated on other grounds, 523 U.S. 1001 
(1998); Christiansen v. Omnicom Grp., Inc., 852 F.3d 195, 
201 (2d Cir. 2017); Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 
260 F.3d 257, 263–64 (3d Cir. 2001); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. 
Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 874–75 (9th Cir. 2001); Higgins 
v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 261 n.4 (1st 
Cir. 1999)). 
138 579 F.3d 285 (3d Cir. 2009). 
139 Prowel, 579 F.3d at 287.  
140 Id. at 290–92.   
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transgender students to different conditions than their 
cisgender peers are subjected to.  
 
We are not alone in reaching this conclusion. In addition 
to the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Whitaker, the Courts of 
Appeals for the Eleventh and Sixth Circuits have concluded 
that discriminating against transgender individuals constitutes 
sex discrimination.141 Similarly, the First Circuit has relied on 
Title VII in holding that a person may state a claim under the 
Equal Credit Opportunity Act, which prohibits discrimination 
“with respect to  . . . sex[,]” if that person does not conform to 
sex stereotypes.142 The Ninth Circuit has also looked to Title 
VII and held that a transgender female inmate who did not 
conform to sex stereotypes could state a claim under the 
Gender Motivated Violence Act.143  
 
We therefore hold that the District Court correctly 
declined to issue an injunction based on the appellants’ Title 
IX claim.  
                                              
141 Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1316–17 (11th Cir. 
2011) (holding that a “person is defined as transgender 
precisely because of the perception that his or her behavior 
transgresses gender stereotypes . . . . Accordingly, 
discrimination against a transgender individual because of her 
gender-nonconformity is sex discrimination”); Smith v. City 
of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that sex 
discrimination under Title VII “encompasses both the 
biological differences between men and women, and gender 
discrimination, that is, discrimination based on a failure to 
conform to stereotypical gender norms”). 
142 Rosa v. Park West Bank & Tr. Co., 214 F.3d 213, 215–16 
(1st Cir. 2000) (holding that the plaintiff, a birth-assigned 
male whose “attire did not accord with his male gender,” 
could state a claim if a banker did not give him a loan). 
143 Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1200, 1202 (9th Cir. 
2000) (“Congress intended proof of gender motivation under 
the GMVA to proceed in the same way that proof of 
discrimination on the basis of sex or race is shown under Title 
VII . . . . ‘[S]ex’ under Title VII encompasses both sex—that 
is, the biological difference between men and women—and 
gender.”). 
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2. The District Court 
correctly concluded that 
the appellants’ state law 
tort claim was unlikely 
to succeed on the merits.  
 
 Finally, the appellants contend that the District Court 
erred in denying the injunction as to their Pennsylvania-law 
tort claim for intrusion upon seclusion. Pennsylvania has 
adopted the Second Restatement of Torts’ definition of 
intrusion upon seclusion: 
 
One who intentionally intrudes, 
physically or otherwise, upon the 
solitude or seclusion of another or 
his private affairs or concerns, is 
subject to the other for invasion of 
his privacy, if the intrusion would 
be highly offensive to a reasonable 
person.144 
  
In denying this claim, the District Court concluded that the 
mere presence of a transgender individual in a bathroom or 
locker room is not the type of conduct that would be highly 
offensive to a reasonable person. As we have noted, students 
in a locker room expect to see other students in varying stages 
of undress, and they expect that other students will see them in 
varying stages of undress. We will affirm the District Court’s 
rejection of the appellants’ tort claim.  
 
B.  Irreparable Harm 
 
In addition to finding that the appellants were unlikely 
to succeed on the merits of their claims, the District Court 
denied injunctive relief because they had not demonstrated that 
the failure to issue an injunction would result in irreparable 
harm. The District Court found that: 
 
                                              
144 Tagouma v. Investigative Consultant Servs, Inc., 4 A.3d 
170, 174 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010) (quoting Restatement (Second) 
of Torts § 652B (1965)). 
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On a practical level . . . the privacy 
protections that are in place at 
BASH, which include the 
bathroom stalls and shower stalls 
in the locker rooms, the bathroom 
stalls in the multi-user bathrooms, 
the availability of a number of 
single-user bathrooms (a few of 
which will have lockers for storing 
items), the [ability] of students to 
store personal items in their locker 
or leave those items with the gym 
teacher, and the availability of the 
team rooms in the locker rooms 
(which would not involve students 
passing through the common area 
of the locker room), and the overall 
willingness of the [appellees] to 
work with the students and their 
families to assure that the students 
are comfortable at BASH, 
mitigates against a finding of 
irreparable harm. . . . The privacy 
protections available to students in 
2017-18 are more than suitable to 
address any privacy concerns 
relating to the presence of 
transgender students in the locker 
rooms and bathrooms at BASH.145  
 
 We agree that the appellants did not demonstrate 
irreparable harm would result from denying an injunction. The 
School District has provided adequate privacy facilities for the 
appellants to use during this litigation. Even if the appellants 
could otherwise succeed on one or more of their claims (and, 
as explained above, we do not suggest that they can), the 
single-user facilities ensure that no appellant faces irreparable 
harm in the meantime.  
                                              
145 Doe v. Boyertown Area Sch. Dist., 276 F. Supp 3d. at 410. 
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III. CONCLUSION 
 
The Boyertown Area School District has adopted a very 
thoughtful and carefully tailored policy in an attempt to address 
some very real issues while faithfully discharging its obligation 
to maintain a safe and respectful environment in which 
everyone can both learn and thrive.   
 
The District Court correctly concluded that the 
appellants’ attempt to enjoin that policy based on an alleged 
violation of their privacy rights and their rights under Title IX 
and Pennsylvania tort law is not likely to succeed on the merits. 
The District Court was also correct in deciding that denying the 
injunction would not irreparably harm the appellants. For the 
reasons set forth above and in the well-reasoned District Court 
opinion, we will affirm the District Court’s denial of the 
requested preliminary injunction.  
